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Abstract—
In this paper, we introduce and evaluate PROPEDEUTICA1,
a novel methodology and framework for efficient and effective
real-time malware detection, leveraging the best of conventional
machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) algorithms.
In PROPEDEUTICA, all software processes in the system start
execution subjected to a conventional ML detector for fast classifi-
cation. If a piece of software receives a borderline classification, it
is subjected to further analysis via more performance expensive
and more accurate DL methods, via our newly proposed DL
algorithm DEEPMALWARE. Further, in an exploratory fashion,
we introduce delays to the execution of software subjected to
DEEPMALWARE as a way to “buy time” for DL analysis and to
rate-limit the impact of possible malware in the system.
We evaluated PROPEDEUTICA with a set of 9,115 malware
samples and 877 commonly used benign software samples from
various categories for the Windows OS. Our results show that
the false positive rate for conventional ML methods can reach
20%, and for modern DL methods it is usually below 6%.
However, the classification time for DL can be 100X longer
than conventional ML methods. PROPEDEUTICA improved the
detection F1-score from 77.54% (conventional ML method)
to 90.25% (16.39% increase), and reduced the detection time
by 54.86%. Further, the percentage of software subjected to
DL analysis was approximately 40% on average. Further, the
application of delays in software subjected to ML reduced the
detection time by approximately 10%. Finally, we found and
discussed a discrepancy between the detection accuracy offline
(analysis after all traces are collected) and on-the-fly (analysis
in tandem with trace collection). Conventional ML experienced
a decrease of 13% in accuracy when executed offline (89.05%)
compared to online (77.54%) with the same traces.
Our insights show that conventional ML and modern DL-
based malware detectors in isolation cannot meet the needs of
efficient and effective malware detection: high accuracy, low false
positive rate, and short classification time.
Keywords: Malware Detection, Deep Learning, Machine
Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware has been continuously evolving [1]. Existing
protection mechanisms do not cope well with the in-
creased sophistication and complexity of modern malware
1In Medicine, propedeutics refers to diagnose a patient condition by first
performing initial non-specialized, low-cost exams, and then proceeding to
specialized, possibly expensive, diagnostic procedures if preliminary exams
are inconclusive.
attacks, especially those performed by advanced persistent
threats (APTs) [2]. Furthermore, malware campaigns are not
homogeneous—malware sophistication varies depending on
the target, the type of service exploited as part of the attack
(e.g., Internet banking, relationship sites), the attack spreading
source (e.g., phishing, drive-by downloads), and the geo-
graphic location of the target.
The industry still relies heavily on anti-virus technology
for threat detection [3], [4]. While it is effective for malware
with known signatures, it is not sustainable given the massive
amount of samples released daily, as well as its inefficacy in
dealing with zero-day and polymorphic/metamorphic malware
(practical detection rates ranging from 25% to 50%) [5], [6].
Confinement-based solutions for running suspicious software,
such as Bromium [6] are also suboptimal because they cannot
guarantee complete isolation—some types of malware will
accomplish their tasks even while confined (e.g., a keylogger
can still record an employees credentials).
Behavior-based approaches attempt to identify malware be-
haviors using instruction sequences [7], [8], computation trace
logic [9] and system (or API) call sequences [10]–[12]. These
solutions have been mostly based on conventional ML mod-
els, such as K-nearest neighbor, SVM, neural networks, and
decision tree algorithms [13]–[16]. However, current solutions
based on ML still suffer from high false-positive rates, mainly
because of (i) the complexity and diversity of current software
and malware [1], [11], [17]–[19], which are hard to capture
during the learning phase of the algorithms, (ii) sub-optimal
feature extraction, (iii) limited training/testing datasets, and the
challenge of concept drift [20].
The accuracy of malware classification depends on gain-
ing sufficient context information and extracting meaningful
abstraction of behaviors. For system-call/API call malware
detection, longer sequences of calls likely contain more in-
formation. However, conventional ML-based detectors (i.e.,
Random Forest [21], Naı¨ve Bayes [22]) often use short win-
dows of system calls during the training process to avoid the
curse of dimensionality (when the dimension increases, the
classification needs more data to support and becomes harder
to solve [23]), and may not be able to extract useful features
for accurate detection. Thus, the main drawback of such
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approaches is that they might lead to many false-positives,
since it is hard to analyze complex and longer sequences
of malicious behaviors with limited window sizes, especially
when malicious and benign behaviors are interposed.
In contrast, DL models [24] are capable of analyzing longer
sequences of system calls and making more accurate classifi-
cation through higher level information extraction. However,
DL requires more time to gain enough information for classi-
fication and to predict the probability of detection. The trade-
off is challenging: fast and not-so-accurate (conventional ML
methods) versus time-consuming and accurate classification
(emerging DL methods).
In this paper, we introduce and evaluate PROPEDEUTICA,
a novel methodology and a proof-of-concept prototype for
the Windows OS for efficient and effective on-the-fly mal-
ware detection, which combines the best of conventional
machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) algorithms.
In PROPEDEUTICA, all software in the system is subjected to
conventional ML for fast classification. If a piece of software
receives a borderline malware classification probability, it is
then subjected to further analysis via our newly proposed
DEEPMALWARE. Further, in an exploratory fashion, PROPE-
DEUTICA adds delays to the execution of software subjected
to DL analysis as a way to ”buy time” for DEEPMALWARE to
finish analysis and to rate-limit the impact of possible malware
in the system while analysis is underway.
The inspiration for our methodology is the practice of
propedeutics Medicine. In Medicine, propedeutics refers to
diagnose a patient condition by first performing initial non-
specialized, low-cost exams or by patient data collection based
on observation, palpation, temperature measurement, and pro-
ceeding to specialized, possibly expensive and diagnostic
procedures only if preliminary exams are inconclusive. In this
paper, our proposal is to first attempt to classify (“diagnose”)
a piece of software (“patient”) as malicious (“experiencing a
medical condition”) using fast conventional ML (simple and
non-expensive ”diagnostic procedures”). If classification re-
sults are borderline (“inconclusive”), the software is subjected
to accurate, but more performance expensive DL methods
(complex, expensive “diagnostic procedures”).
We evaluated PROPEDEUTICA with a set of 9,115 malware
samples and 877 common benign software from various cate-
gories for the Windows OS. Our results show that for a (config-
urable) borderline interval of classification probability [30%-
70%], approximately 10% of the system software needed to
be subjected to DL analysis. In this case, software that were
classified as malware by conventional ML with probability less
than 30% were considered benign and software classified as
malware with probability over 70% were considered malicious.
For these 10% of borderline cases, our novel DL algorithm
malware achieved an accuracy of 95.54% and false positive
rate of 4.10%. Further, we found a discrepancy between de-
tection accuracy offline (analysis after all traces are collected)
and on-the-fly (analysis in tandem with trace collection). For
example, Random Forest (conventional ML) experienced a
decrease of 13% in accuracy when executed offline (89.05%)
compared to online (78%) with same traces. This show that
real-time detection differs from offline detection as interactions
between the system and the detectors are involved, making
the malware detection an even more challenging problem.
We also found that adding delays to software subjected to
DEEPMALWARE decreases the malware detection time in
approximately 10% on average. These results corroborate our
main hypothesis that conventional ML and modern DL-based
malware detectors in isolation cannot meet the needs of high
accuracy, low false positive rate, and short detection time of
the challenging task of real-time malware detection.
This paper presents the following contributions: (i) We
introduce a new methodology for efficient and effective real-
time malware detection, (ii) we implement and evaluate this
methodology in a proof-of-concept prototype, PROPEDEU-
TICA, for the Windows OS with a comprehensive collection
of malware and benign software and (iii) we introduce a novel
DL algorithm, DEEPMALWARE, which specializes in malware
classification using enriched features from system calls (not
API calls).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the threat model that motivates our
work. In Section III, we introduce an overview of the ar-
chitecture design of PROPEDEUTICA. Section IV shows the
implementation details of the system call monitoring driver
and the HYBRID DETECTOR in our prototype. In Section V,
we discuss the comprehensive experiments with offline and
on-the-fly analysis on a real-time system. Related work is
discussed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this
paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
PROPEDEUTICA’s protection is designed for corporate se-
curity, in which it is not common to find deep learning specific
GPUs available on regular employees’ devices. We assume that
organizations require on-the-fly malware detection in a timely
manner with good accuracy and few false positives, and not to
interfere with employee’s primary tasks. We also assume that if
an organization is a target of a motivated attacker, malware will
eventually get in. Further, our trusted computing base includes
the Windows OS kernel, the learning models running in user
land and the hardware stack.
III. THE ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN OF PROPEDEUTICA
This section provides an overview of the architectural design
of PROPEDEUTICA. PROPEDEUTICA comprises three main
components (see Figure 1) (i) a system call monitoring driver,
(ii) a hybrid malware detector module, and (iii) an interaction
module. The system call monitoring driver works in kernel
mode and is responsible for intercepting system calls and
probabilistically adding delays to the execution of software
subjected to DEEPMALWARE. The hybrid malware detector
module, called HYBRID DETECTOR, operates in user land and
is composed of a system call reconstruction module, a conven-
tional ML-detector and our newly proposed DEEPMALWARE
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DL-based detector. The interaction module mediates the in-
teractions between HYBRID DETECTOR and the system call
monitoring driver.
As Figure 1 shows, when the system starts, system calls
invoked by all the processes will be logged into the system
call logging queues in user space (Step 1). Each system call
will be associated with the PID of the invoking process.
The HYBRID DETECTOR will follow the tail of the system
call logging queue (Step 2), and generate sliding windows of
system calls for each PID with the help of the reconstruction
module (Step 3). The conventional ML detector will take in
these sliding windows and start classifying the system call
traces for each process.
If the ML detector predicts a piece of software S as malware
with a classification probability p within the borderline interval
range, S will be subjected to further analysis by DEEPMAL-
WARE for a definite classification, and a signal for applying
delays to S will be sent to the interaction module (Step 4a).
The interaction module will request the system call monitoring
driver to apply delays (Step 5a). If the ML detector classifies
S as malware with a probability higher than the borderline
interval, a kill signal will be sent to the interaction module, and
S will be killed (Step 4c and 5b). If the ML detector classifies
S as malware with a probability smaller than the borderline
interval, the monitoring of Ss execution will continue via the
ML detector or a remove delay signal will be sent to the
interaction module (Step 4b), which will request the system
call monitoring driver to stop applying delays to S’s execution
(Step 5a).
A. The System Call Monitoring Driver
The goal of the system call monitoring driver is to (i) con-
tinuously intercept Windows system calls and record them into
logging queues to serve as input to the HYBRID DETECTOR
and (ii) apply delays in selected system calls for all software
subjected to DEEPMALWARE.
The driver was implemented for Windows 7 SP1
32-bit. PROPEDEUTICA’s operation relies on obtaining
comprehensive information about processes behavior in the
form of system calls. In Windows 7 32-bit system, there are
400 entries of system calls [25]. However, only a subset of
them is officially documented by Microsoft. We found that
unofficial documentation about system call parameters could
be misleading and in some cases lead to Blue Screen Of
Death (BSOD). Thus, we decided to collect only information
about system calls that would not cause BSOD when
intercepted. In total, our driver was able to successfully
intercept 155 system calls (listed in the Appendix), including
network-related system calls (e.g., NtListenPort
and NtAlpcConnectPort), file-related system calls
(e.g., NtCreateFile and NtReadFile), memory
related system calls (e.g., NtReadVirtualMemory and
NtWriteVirtualMemory), process-related system calls
(e.g., NtTerminateProcess and NtResumeProcess),
and other types (e.g., NtOpenSemaphore and
NtGetPlugPlayEvent).
To the best of our knowledge, this represents the largest
system call set that has been hooked by a driver in the
literature [26]–[31]. Our driver is publicly available at [32].
Delay Mechanism In an exploratory fashion we introduced
a delay mechanism to PROPEDEUTICA, whose goal is to “buy
time” for DEEPMALWARE analysis and rate-limit the actions
of potential malware while analysis is underway. Based on the
analysis of our malware dataset we identified a set of common
malware behaviors and the associated system calls (Table I).
It is worth to notice that these system calls alone do not imply
malicious behavior, but they can be part of a chain of actions
that may lead to a security violation.
TABLE I: Common malware behaviors and examples of system calls
invoked to accomplish such behaviors.
Common Malware Behavior Associated System Calls
Hiding specific processes
NtOpenThread
NtOpenProcess
NtQuerySystemInformation
Modifying virtual memory NtReadVirtualMemoryNtWriteVirtualMemory
Code Injection
NtDebugActiveProcess
NtQueueApcThread
NtMapViewOfSection
NtSetContextThread
Modifying system files NtReadFileNtWriteFile
Privilege escalation NtPrivilegeCheck
We chose 18 system calls (from the 155 intercepted system
calls) we found particularly relevant to malware behavior
to be subjected to delays when their invoking process was
being analyzed by DEEPMALWARE (see Table VIII in the
Appendix).
We introduce the following delay strategies:
1) Slowing down the access to critical files: This strategy
slows down malware from trojanizing system binaries and in-
fecting other software. It is implemented through the addition
of sleep time in system calls returning a file handle related to
system file set, e.g., NtCreateFile. The system file set is
configurable (in this paper we set it to C : \Windows\).
2) Slowing down memory accesses: This strategy reduces
the probability of malware accessing unshared memory. It is
implemented through adding a sleep time in system calls such
as NtCreateSection.
3) Slowing down the creation of processes/threads: This
strategy slows down malware children processes creation. It
is implemented through adding sleep to system calls such as
NtCreateProcess and NtCreateThread.
4) Slowing down network connections: This strategy goal
mitigates the effect of flooders and is applied to system calls
using a network handles, such as NtListenPort.
The strength of the delays can be adjusted by a system ad-
ministrator, through manipulating a THRESHOLD. The higher
the THRESHOLD, the higher probability that a delay will be
applied to a system call. In our work, we set the THRESHOLD
at 10%. This means that whenever a system call subjected
to the delay mechanism (see examples in Table I) is invoked,
there is a 10% probability that a delay strategy will be applied
to it.
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Fig. 1: The workflow of PROPEDEUTICA. The system call monitoring driver will record system call into the system call logging queues. The
HYBRID DETECTOR will read system calls from the queues, analyze on the system calls, and signal the interaction module with classification
results. The interaction module will take in the signal and carry out the action for the corresponding software.
B. HYBRID DETECTOR
The HYBRID DETECTOR operates in user land and is
composed of: (i) a reconstruction module to generate sliding
windows of system calls to be used as input to the ML and DL
classifiers; (ii) a conventional ML classifier with a configurable
borderline interval, and (iii) our newly proposed DL classifier,
DEEPMALWARE.
In PROPEDEUTICA, system calls invoked by software in the
system are collected and parsed by the reconstruction module.
The conventional ML classifier and DEEPMALWARE share the
preprocessed input stream from reconstruction module. The
reconstruction module reconstructs the observed sequence of
system calls in a compressed format that is appropriate to
be consumed by the learning models (see Section IV-B1 for
details).
The conventional ML classifier receives as input sliding
windows of system calls traces labeled by the PID of the
process which invoked them. The ML classifier introduces
a configurable borderline probability interval [lower bound,
upper bound], which determines the range of classification
probability that is considered borderline, i.e., inconclusive. For
example, consider a borderline interval in the range [20%-
80%]. In this case, if a piece of software receives a “malware”
classification probability by the ML classifier, which falls
into the range [20%-80%], we consider that the classification
for this software is inconclusive. If the software receives a
“malware” classification probability of less than 20%, we
consider that the software is benign. In contrast, if the software
receives a malware classification probability greater than 80%,
we consider the software malicious. For the inconclusive case,
this piece of software continues to execute in the system,
but now it is subject to analysis by DEEPMALWARE for a
definite classification. If DEEPMALWARE classification for the
software is “malware”, the software is killed. Otherwise, the
software is considered benign and continues execution being
monitored by the conventional ML classifier in the system.
Lower and upper bounds are configurable depending on how
conservative or lax the administrator wants the detector to be.
Fig. 2: The architecture of the interaction module. The I/O man-
ager enables the communication between the user land the HY-
BRID DETECTOR and the kernel land system call monitoring driver.
Taskkill helps forcefully kill malware (labeled with PID) and all
its child processes.
DEEPMALWARE is a multi-stream DL-based malware clas-
sification algorithm leveraging CNN, RNN, and their variants
to analyze traces of system calls. DEEPMALWARE learns from
the multi-stream input, extracts semantic sequences, classifies,
and detects the suspicious sequences (see Section IV-B for
details).
C. The Interaction Module
The goal of the interaction module is to allow the HY-
BRID DETECTOR (user land) to communicate with the kernel
land system call monitoring driver, and with other user land
processes (e.g., to send a kill signal to a piece of malware).
As Figure 2 shows, the HYBRID DETECTOR will send a sig-
nal with <PID, Action> to the interaction module. The Action
can apply/remove delay on a process, or simply kill the pro-
cess. A signal of applying/removing delay will be forwarded
to the delay mechanism in the system call monitoring driver.
This is implemented by sending I/O request packets (IRP)
to the queue of IRP managed by the I/O manager. The I/O
manager will associate the packet to a corresponding device,
which in our case is created by the system call monitoring
driver. The driver uses IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL to read
the I/O packets.
A signal of kill will be forwarded to Taskkill with the
PID information. Taskkill will forcefully kill the process
and all its child processes.
4
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPEDEUTICA
In this section, we will show the implementation details of
the system call monitoring driver and the HYBRID DETECTOR.
A. The System Call Monitoring Driver
The system call monitoring driver is responsible for (i)
intercepting Windows system calls and (ii) introducing delays
to processes subject to DEEPMALWARE.
There are multiple tools to monitor API or system calls,
such as Process Monitor [33], drstrace library [34], Core
OS Tool [35], and WinDbg’s Logger [36]. Process Monitor
and drstrace library collect API calls. However, obfuscated
malware will detect the tracing operation and change their
behavior accordingly to prevent analysis. WinDbg Logger
is mainly designed for debugging and is cumbersome for
automated analysis because one has to click a button to save
current traces to a file. Core OS Tool leverages ETW (Event
Tracing for Windows) and only collect traces for a target
software. Thus, while very useful for other contexts, these
tools are not sufficient for real-time monitoring and analysis
of all processes running on a Windows system. Therefore, we
designed and implemented our own system call monitoring
driver to monitor system calls and address some issues from
the mentioned tools: our driver operates at the kernel level,
making it hard for user-level malware to tamper with it
or evade interception—most malware today can detect user
level tracing and change behavior [37]; our driver is able
to perform whole-system system call interception, since that
DEEPMALWARE does not analyze processes in isolation—the
context of processes’ interactions with other processes in the
system is considered.
The system call monitoring driver is implemented through
hooking the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT), which
contains an array of function pointers to important sys-
tem service routines, including system call routines. To
get access to SSDT, we leverage ntoskrnl.exe in
Windows 7, which provides the kernel and executive
layers of the Windows NT kernel space and at the
meantime exports KeServiceDescriptorTable. The
KeServiceDescriptorTable points to the System
Service Table (SST), and SST contains a field naming
ServiceTable pointing to the virtual addresses of SSDT.
The SSDT entries are located in read-only memory, so we
toggled the WP flag (default 0 for read-only) in the CR0
register to gain write access to the entries.
As Figure 3 shows, when a system call is invoked, the
original function pointer will be saved as the dashed arrow
shows (Step 0). Then the system call will be redirected to a
new function pointer (Step 1). At this place, the system call
will be recorded (Step 2). If the current process in not in
the list of processes receiving borderline classification from
the conventional ML detector, the invoked system call will be
returned to the original pointer directly (Step 4). Otherwise,
the system call will go through the delay mechanism with
a probability (defined by a threshold), sleep for a while
(Step 3), and then return to the original pointer (Step 4). In
Fig. 3: The process of hooking SSDT structure. When system call
NtAcceptConnectPort is invoked, we save the original pointer
through the dashed arrow (Step 0). Then the system call will be
redirected to a new pointer (Step 1) and the invocation will be
recorded to file (Step 2). If the current process is identified as
suspicious (borderline classification), we apply the delaying strategy
with a threshold (Step 3a). Finally, the system call will be returned
to the original pointer (Step 4).
this last case, the driver is not only recording a newly invoked
system call to the log file, but also subjecting this system call
to the delay mechanism.
We maintain a Borderline_PIDs list in the driver to
keep a record of processes that get a borderline classification
from the conventional ML detector and use kernel function
GetCurrentProcessId() to get the PID of the current
process that invokes the system call. A random float be-
tween 0 to 1 will be generated. If the float is greater than
the threshold (by default 10%), the system call will be
returned; otherwise, a sleep with sleep_time (by default
50ms) will be added to the call, and then the system call
will be returned. PIDs in Borderline_PIDs can be added
or removed depending on the mediation of the Interaction
Module.
System call logs are collected using DbgPrint Logger [38].
DbgPrint Logger enables real-time kernel message logging to
a specified IP address (localhost or remote IP)—therefore the
logging pool and the hybrid detector can either reside on a PC
or a cloud server. For devices having limited computational re-
sources, cloud-based logging and analysis make the detection
more efficient and scalable.
The format of system call logging record is <timestamp,
PID, syscall>. It contains the time the system call is invoked,
the PID of the process, and the system call number (identifi-
cation).
B. HYBRID DETECTOR Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation of HY-
BRID DETECTOR, including the reconstruction module, the
conventional ML detector, and DEEPMALWARE, our newly
proposed DL based multi-stream malware detector.
Both the conventional ML and the DEEPMALWARE use
the reconstruction module to preprocess the input system
call sequences and obtain the same preprocessed data. Since
considerable amount of research on conventional ML-based
malware detection has been done (see Section VI), we only
describe DEEPMALWARE in this section.
Figure 4 provides a workflow of our DL-based malware
detection approach. System call sequences are taken as input
for all processes subjected to DL analysis (those that received
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a borderline classification from the conventional ML detector).
The next subsection explains this workflow in details.
1) Reconstruction module:
The reconstruction module first splits system calls se-
quences according to the PIDs of processes invoking them.
Next, it parses these sequences into three types of sequential
data: process-wide n-gram sequence, process-wide density
sequence, and system-wide frequency feature vector, explained
below. Then, it converts the sequential data into windows using
the sliding window method. The sliding window method is
usually used to translate a sequential classification problem
into a classical classification problem, and also works well
with a large amount of data [39].
Process-wide n-gram sequence and density sequence
N-gram model is widely used in problems of natural lan-
guage processing (NLP). Because of the similarity between
sentences and system call sequences, many pieces of previ-
ous work have been proposed leveraging n-gram model for
malware detection [11], [40]–[42]. We define n-gram as a
combination of n contiguous system calls. N-gram model
encodes low-level features with simplicity and scalability.
We use the n-gram model to compress sequences. N-gram
compresses the data by reducing the length of each sequence
with encoded information. The workload of processes is
intensive in our model—more than 1,000 system calls can
be generated in one second, resulting in very large sliding
windows. Such long sequences of intensive system calls not
only make it hard to train ML/DL but also consume time
for detection. Therefore, we further compress the system call
sequences and translate them into two-stream sequences: n-
gram sequences and density sequences. Given the encoded
n-gram model sequences, we group the repeated n-gram units
and convert them into two sequences. For instance, using 5-
gram, we reduce the average sequence length from 52,806
to 4,935 with a compression ratio of 10.7. Thus, n-gram
sequence is a list of n-gram units, while density sequence is the
corresponding frequency statistics of repeated n-gram units.
There are many variants such as n-gram, n-tuple, n-bag, and
other non-trivial and hierarchical combinations (i.e., “tuples of
bags,” “bags of bags,” and “bags of grams”) [11]. We only
use 2-gram in the experiments, because (i) n-gram model
is considered the most appropriate for such classification
problems [11] and (ii) the embedding layer and first few
convolutional neural layers (Section IV-B2) can automatically
extract high-level features from neighbor grams, which can be
seen as hierarchical combinations of multiple n-grams.
Once n-gram sequences fill up a sliding window, the recon-
struction module delivers the window of sequences to either
the ML or DEEPMALWARE and redirects incoming system
calls to new n-gram sequences.
System-wide frequency feature vector As we mentioned
before, our learning models make use of system calls from
all processes running in the system. Our hypothesis is that
such holistic (opposite to process-specific) approach will prove
more effective for malware detection than current approaches,
since modern malware perform interactions among multi-
ple processes in the system to accomplish malicious behav-
iors [43], [44]. System-wide information helps the models
learn the interactions among all processes running on the
system. To gain whole system information, the reconstruction
module collects the frequency of different types of n-grams
from all processes during the sliding window and extract them
as a frequency feature vector. Each element of the vector
represents the frequency of an n-gram unit in the sequence.
To match the n-gram sequence with the produced sliding
window, deep learning-based classifier uses the frequency
feature vector to represent the system calls invoked during
the referred sliding window.
2) DEEPMALWARE:
DEEPMALWARE is a multi-stream malware classifier in
which two types of DL networks are applied: (i) recurrent
neural networks (RNN) [45], which can gather broad context
information with a sequence model and can achieve state-
of-the-art performance in processing sequence data and (ii)
convolutional neural networks (CNN) [46], which extract low-
level features and allowing DEEPMALWARE to gain strong
spatially local correlation without handcrafted feature engi-
neering.
DEEPMALWARE leverages n-gram sequences of processes
and frequency feature vectors of the system. First, two streams
(process-wide n-gram sequence and density sequence) model
the sequence and density of n-gram system calls of the process.
The third stream represents the global frequency feature vector
of the whole system. DEEPMALWARE consists of four main
components, namely N-gram Embedding, (Atrous) Convolu-
tional Layers, Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Layers, and
Fully Connected Layers (Figure 5).
N-gram Embedding. We adopt an encoding scheme called
N-gram Embedding, which converts sparse n-gram unit into
dense representation. After Bengio et al. introduced word
embedding [47], it has been formulated as a foundation module
in NLP problems. In DEEPMALWARE, n-gram units are treated
as discrete atomic inputs (word). N-gram Embedding helps in
understanding the relationship between functionally correlated
system calls and provides meaningful information of each n-
gram to the learning system. Unlike vector representations
such as one-hot vectors, which may cause data sparsity, N-
gram Embedding mitigates sparsity and reduces the dimension
of input n-gram units.
The embedding layer maps system call sequences to a high-
dimensional vector. It helps in the extraction of semantic
knowledge from low-level features (system call sequences)
and largely reduce feature dimension. In the DL model, 256
neurons are used in the embedding layer, which reduces the
dimension of n-gram model from 3,526 (number of unique
n-grams in the evaluation) to 256. Because the sequence
length (number of n-gram units) in each sample varies, longer
samples are truncated and shorter samples are padded with
zeros.
(Atrous) Convolutional Layers. Conventional sliding win-
dow methods leverage small windows of system call sequences
and, therefore, are severe difficulties modeling long sequences.
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Fig. 4: Workflow of the deep learning based malware detection
Fig. 5: Illustration of DEEPMALWARE. The model consists of four main components—n-gram embedding, (atrous) convolutional layers
(Conv3, Conv5, Conv7, and AtrousConv3), bidirectional LSTM layers, and fully connected layers. N-gram embedding is only applied to
the process-wide n-gram Sequence. Convolutional layers are inception-like with 1× 3, 1× 5, 1× 7 kernel filters, where all the outputs are
concatenated to extract local and global information. Two atrous convolutional layers are followed to enlarge the receptive field. The two
streams are combined with element-wise multiplication. Four bidirectional LSTM layers model the global context information. We get the
final prediction after three fully connected layers and a softmax activation layer.
A key concern is that these methods represent features in a
rather simple way, which may be inadequate for a classification
task.
We borrow the inception design from GoogleNet [48],
which applies multi-scale convolutional kernel filters on the
same inputs in parallel and concatenates the output features.
Features are extracted with different receptive fields, and lower
level features and higher level features are fused together. This
design has been proved to be robust and speed-up large-scale
image classification. We use 1×3, 1×5, and 1×7 convolutional
layers, and applies padding on each convolutional branch to
keep their lengths aligned.
We use the atrous convolutional layer [49] (a variant of
convolutional layers) after the inception model. Atrous con-
volution layer as a dilated convolutional layer allows us to
enlarge the field-of-view of filters. It employs spatially small
convolution kernels to keep both computation and number
of parameters contained without increasing the number of
parameters and the amount of computation. Thus, it represents
an efficient mechanism to increase the field of view in the
convolutional layers. The output of the atrous convolutional
layer can be described as:
y(i) =
K∑
k=1
x(i+ r · k)w(k) (1)
where y(i) denotes the output of Atrous convolutional layer
of x(i) with filter w(k) of length K. r is the ratio of dilation.
We deploy batch normalization after convolutional layers to
speed up the training process [50] and a non-linear activation
function, ReLU to avoid saturation.
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Layers. The internal
dependencies between system calls include meaningful context
information or unknown patterns for identifying malicious
behaviors. To leverage this information, we adopt one of the
recurrent architectures, LSTM [45], for its strong capability
on learning meaningful temporal/sequential patterns in a se-
quence and reflecting internal state changes modulated by the
recurrent weights. This architecture is proved robust against
noises in input sequences.
Our LSTM layers gather information from the first two
streams: process-wide n-gram sequence and density sequence.
Fully Connected Layers. A fully connected layer is de-
ployed to encode system-wide frequency. Then, it is con-
catenated with n-gram three fully-connected layers to gather
both sequence-based process information and frequency-based
system-wide information. The output of last fully-connected
layer is transformed into the probability of a process being
malicious, through a softmax activation layer.
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V. EVALUATION
Our evaluation’s goal is to answer the following research
questions: (i) is the combination of conventional ML and
DL more effective for online malware detection than using
such approaches in isolation (i.e., to what extent does our
HYBRID DETECTOR outperform ML on accuracy and DL
on classification time)? (ii) to what extent the application of
delays to software subject to DL helps the detection process?
In this section, we will first describe in details the malware
and benign software dataset used for our evaluation. Next, we
show and compare the results we obtained regarding malware
classification using ML and DL in an offline (post-processing
mode, analysis machine), and on-the-fly on a real system.
A. Dataset
For the evaluation, we used Windows malware samples
collected since 2013 from a major financial institution incident
response team through customer notification of malware in-
the-wild, a security mechanism installed on online banking
clients, and phishing messages. To ensure the effectiveness of
the experiment, other malware in-the-wild are not considered
as they may have been outdated or could not function properly.
This set of malware samples comprises 9,115 files of PE32
format. Our evaluation also used 7 APTs collected from
Rekings [51]. For benign software, we used 877 samples—866
Windows benchmark-based software, 11 GUI-based software,
and dozens of system software (e.g., svchost.exe, dllhost.exe,
smss.exe), listed in Table II. For the GUI-based software, we
used WinAutomation [52] to simulate keyboard and mouse
operations.
TABLE II: Categories of benign software used in our evaluation.
Benchmark-based software GUI-based software
Apache Bench [53] Microsoft Word
NovaBench [54] Microsoft Office
WinSAT [55] Windows Media Player
WMIC [56] Chrome Browser
HCK Test Suite [57] Calculator
GeekBench [58] Windows Folder
As we described before, all conventional ML and DL
models used sliding windows of Windows OS system calls
as features for classification. We did not include system call
arguments as the features for the learning models, because of
the overhead of collecting system call arguments and the sig-
nificant increase these arguments would cause in the dimension
of the learning models. We collected five datasets of system
calls via running five datasets in different combinations:
1) 1M1B: one malware sample, one benchmark-based soft-
ware and dozens of system software;
2) 1M1R: one malware sample, one GUI-based software 2
and dozens of system software;
3) 2M3B: two malware samples, three benchmark-based
software and dozens of system software;
4) 1M1R2: one malware sample, one GUI-based software
and dozens of system software;
2This includes test cases with daily used benign software, e.g., editing a
Microsoft Word file, calculating with Excel, playing music and so on.
5) APT: one APT sample, one GUI-based software and
dozens of system software.
In each experiment, we ran malware, benchmark-based/GUI
based software and system software based on the combinations
from the aforementioned five datasets. During the life cycle
of an experiment, only one or two malicious processes will
be opened and closed, but more than 200 benign processes
will be opened and closed. Thereby we collected system calls
from many more benign processes (647,138) than malicious
processes (9,115). The datasets are described in detail in
Table III.
TABLE III: Description of the five datasets generated for our evalu-
ation. Size denotes the size in GB of the formatted system call logs
collected in the experiments.
Number of
Experiments
Number of
Malware Processes
Number of
Benign Processes Size (GB)
1M1B 780 5,395 195,498 8.38
1M1R 3,322 824 131,360 3.17
2M3R 497 1,149 20,492 0.71
1M1R2 839 886 133,167 3.22
APT 7 8 1,818 0.07
Total 6,249 9,115 647,138 19.66
Each experiment lasted for five minutes to collect system-
wide system calls. Some malware samples, however, caused
blue screen of death (BSOD) before the five minutes had
elapsed. Thus, we set a minimum running time of one minute
for a malware sample to be included in our analysis. We
use the 1M1B, 1M1R, and 2M3B dataset for training and
validation. We use the 1M1R2 and APT dataset for testing
on different settings and different malware. (In the future, we
will test malware based on different malware families.)
Imbalanced datasets (in which the number of malware and
benign processes are not equally represented) may adversely
affect the training process, because the ML classifier is prone
to learn from the majority class [59]. We under-sampled
the data by reducing the number of benign sliding window
samples the same as the number of malware ones. We ap-
plied sliding window to analyze traces and tested feasible
combinations of window sizes and strides. Window size and
stride are two important hyper-parameters in sliding window
methods indicating the total and the shifting number of n-gram
system calls in each process. Large window sizes provide more
context for DL models. In our experiments, we selected and
compared three window size and stride pairs: (100, 50), (200,
100), (500, 250). Then we divided dataset 1M1B, 1M1R, and
2M3B into training and validation dataset with ratio 9 : 1.
Table IV shows a comparison among existing datasets based
on Windows API or system calls for malware detection. The
datasets we generated in this paper are larger and more up-
to-date than existing ones. We included not only benchmark
software, but also GUI-based software which are challenging
to configure and automate because of the need to simulate user
activity.
Another dataset not listed in Table IV (because it is not
public anymore) is Anubis [31], which collected hybrid traces
from benign and malicious behaviors and used to play a major
role in many research projects.
8
TABLE IV: Comparison among existing datasets with PROPEDEU-
TICA.
Dataset Name Year Number ofMalware Processes
Number of Benign
Software Processes
ADFA-IDS [26] 2014 855 0
CSDMC [27] 2010 320 68
Nitro [28] 2011 1943 285
SPADE [29] 2011 640 570
Xiao and Stibor [30] 2010 2176 161
PROPEDEUTICA 2017 9115 647138
B. Offline Post-processing of Traces: ML, DL, and the DEEP-
MALWARE
In this section, we compare the performance of conventional
ML (in isolation), DL (in isolation), and the HYBRID DETEC-
TOR when the system call traces from malware and benign
software are completely collected before being analyzed by
the models—offline post-processing. We compared the three
approaches separately and considered the values of accuracy,
precision, recall, f1 score, false positive rate, detection time.
For conventional ML, we considered the following algo-
rithms: Random Forest (RF) [21], eXtreme Gradient Boost-
ing (XGBoost) [60], and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) [61].
Random Forest, neural networks, and boosted trees have
been shown to be the best three supervised models on high-
dimensional data [62]. We used AdaBoost and XGBoost, a
new fast gradient based boosting algorithm, as the representa-
tives of boosted trees. The input features of these algorithms
are the frequency of n-gram in a sliding window of system
calls belonging to a process.
For DL, we considered the following three models: DEEP-
MALWARE (our newly proposed model), and two DL control
models — CNNLSTM, LSTM. Compared to DEEPMALWARE
(see Section IV-B), CNNLSTM and LSTM have a similar
architecture, but do not have dilated and convolutional lay-
ers respectively. The architecture of CNNLSTM and LSTM
models are depicted in Appendix A.
The HYBRID DETECTOR used Random Forest for con-
ventional ML classification and DEEPMALWARE DL classi-
fication. As described later in this section, we chose these
algorithms because they produced the best overall performance
when executed in isolation (see Table V for details).
We use scikit-learn [63] and PyTorch [64] to implement all
conventional ML and DL algorithms. The training and testing
processes ran on an Ubuntu 14.04 Server with four Nvidia
Tesla K80 GPUs and 16 Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2667 CPU cores.
We combined dataset 1M1B, 1M1R, and 2M3B dataset as
the training/validation dataset in the offline post-processing
experiments. The testing dataset was Dataset 1M1R2. During
the testing process, we randomly choose traces from 856
malware and 856 benign software respectively (about 10% of
the whole datasets) and tested the models for 10 times for a
more accurate average result.
Table V shows the results we obtained by comparing
conventional ML and DL algorithms on Dataset 1M1R2 with
offline post-processing analysis. We measured the accuracy,
precision, recall, F1 score, and false positive (fp) rate as the
metrics of model performance. We also compared the detection
time for each algorithm using CPU and GPU. GPU devices
not only reduce the training time for DL models, but also help
DL models achieve classification time one order of magnitude
less than compared to conventional CPUs. We did not apply
GPU devices to ML models because their classification time
with conventional CPUs is already much smaller (at least one
order of magnitude) than those measured for DL algorithms.
We denote ‘N/A’ as not applicable in Table V. In real life,
GPU devices, especially specific DL GPUs for accelerating
DL training/testing are not widespread in end-user or corporate
devices. Thus, anti-malware solutions for such public currently
does not rely on GPUs.
As shown in Table V, the performance of DEEPMALWARE
model improves with the increase of window size and stride.
The best deep learning model is DEEPMALWARE with
window size 500 and stride 250 (97.03% accuracy, 97.02%,
and 2.43% false positive rate). The best conventional ML
model is Random Forest with window size 500 and stride
250. The DEEPMALWARE model outperforms Random Forest
by 3.09% (accuracy) and 3.29% (F1 score) with window size
500 and stride 250. Large window size and stride provide more
context for DL to analyze at a time. However, the detection
time of DEEPMALWARE is higher than that of Random
Forest. On average, it is approximately 100 times slower in
conventional CPUs than conventional ML algorithms. Even in
GPU devices, DEEPMALWARE can be 3 to 5 times slower on
average than conventional ML algorithms.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the HYBRID DE-
TECTOR for different borderline intervals, but still leveraging
offline processing of system call traces.
Based on the results from Table V, we use the overall best
DL model (DEEPMALWARE) and the best overall conven-
tional ML model (Random Forest) and evaluate them using
various borderline intervals. However, on-the-fly processing
brings extra workloads (see details in Section V-D), where
PROPEDEUTICA takes more time to fill up a sliding window
compared to offline post-processing. Hence, we used a smaller
sliding window (window size 100 and stride size 50) in
this evaluation. If a piece of software receives a malware
classification probability from Random Forest that is smaller
than the lower bound or greater than the upper bound, it
is considered benign software or malware respectively. If its
malware probability falls within the borderline interval, the
software is subjected to DEEPMALWARE analysis.
Table VI shows the performance of the HYBRID DETECTOR
for various borderline intervals. We chose lower bound as
10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%, upper bound as 60%, 70%,
80%, and 90%. With a borderline interval of [40%-60%], the
hybrid approach moved approximately 20% of the samples
for DL analysis. In other words, 20% of samples (malware
and benign software) received a classification score between
40-60% with Random Forest. For these samples, DEEPMAL-
WARE performed with almost 90% accuracy and less than
6% of false positive rates. This highlights the potential of the
PROPEDEUTICA paradigm: 80% of the samples were quickly
classified with high accuracy as malicious or benign using
an initial triage with fast conventional ML. Only 20% of
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TABLE V: Comparison between conventional ML and DL models in isolation and in offline analysis
Model Window Size Stride Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score FP Rate Analyzing Timewith GPU (s)
Analyzing Time
with CPU (s)
ML
AdaBoost 100 50 79.25% 78.11% 81.31% 79.67% 22.80% N/A 0.0187
Random Forest 100 50 89.05% 84.63% 95.44% 89.71% 17.35% N/A 0.0089
XGBoost 100 50 84.78% 90.99% 77.22% 83.54% 7.66% N/A 0.0116
DL
CNNLSTM 100 50 94.82% 92.98% 96.96% 94.93% 7.32% 0.0410 1.5533
LSTM 100 50 94.10% 90.91% 98.01% 94.32% 9.81% 0.0098 2.8076
DEEPMALWARE 100 50 94.84% 92.63% 97.43% 94.97% 7.76% 0.0383 1.4104
ML
AdaBoost 200 100 78.27% 72.84% 90.19% 80.59% 33.64% N/A 0.0132
Random Forest 200 100 93.49% 89.99% 97.90% 93.77% 10.91% N/A 0.0063
XGBoost 200 100 70.81% 63.65% 97.08% 76.89% 70.81% N/A 0.0073
DL
CNNLSTM 200 100 95.78% 93.54% 98.36% 95.89% 6.80% 0.0492 1.4332
LSTM 200 100 94.86% 92.96% 97.08% 94.97% 7.36% 0.0947 2.6715
DEEPMALWARE 200 100 94.96% 93.05% 97.20% 95.08% 7.27% 0.0543 1.3784
ML
AdaBoost 500 250 81.81% 79.44% 85.86% 82.52% 22.24% N/A 0.0108
Random Forest 500 250 93.94% 97.16% 90.54% 93.73% 2.65% N/A 0.0048
XGBoost 500 250 79.19% 94.14% 62.27% 74.95% 3.88% N/A 0.0062
DL
CNNLSTM 500 250 95.33% 97.20% 93.34% 95.23% 2.69% 0.0902 1.8908
LSTM 500 250 95.81% 97.38% 94.16% 95.74% 2.54% 0.1529 3.5626
DEEPMALWARE 500 250 97.03% 97.54% 96.50% 97.02% 2.43% 0.0797 1.3344
TABLE VI: Comparison on different borderline policies for the HYBRID DETECTOR in offline analysis with window size 100 and stride 50.
Borderline intervals are described with a lower bound and an upper bound. The move percentage represents the percentage of software in
the system that received a borderline classification with Random Forest (according to the borderline interval) and was subjected to further
analysis with DEEPMALWARE.
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound Accuracy Precision Recall F1 FP Rate
Analyzing Time
with GPU (s)
Analyzing Time
with CPU (s)
Move
Percentage
10% 90% 94.71% 92.41% 97.43% 94.85% 8.00% 0.0223 0.3810 55.95%
20% 80% 94.61% 92.23% 97.43% 94.76% 8.21% 0.0173 0.1543 48.32%
30% 70% 94.34% 91.77% 97.43% 94.51% 8.75% 0.0146 0.0884 41.45%
40% 60% 93.72% 90.79% 97.37% 93.96% 9.92% 0.0123 0.0497 34.96%
20% 90% 94.00% 91.25% 97.38% 94.21% 9.38% 0.0196 0.2095 37.73%
20% 70% 93.93% 91.11% 97.41% 94.14% 9.56% 0.0168 0.1244 37.43%
20% 60% 93.59% 90.54% 97.43% 93.85% 10.25% 0.0156 0.1021 36.61%
30% 90% 93.81% 90.93% 97.42% 94.05% 9.79% 0.0175 0.1506 37.10%
30% 80% 93.92% 91.12% 97.40% 94.14% 9.57% 0.0157 0.1075 36.58%
30% 60% 93.71% 90.76% 97.41% 93.95% 9.99% 0.0139 0.0735 35.27%
40% 90% 93.86% 91.06% 97.36% 94.09% 9.64% 0.0152 0.1140 35.03%
40% 80% 93.93% 91.22% 97.31% 94.15% 9.45% 0.0137 0.0778 34.15%
40% 70% 93.92% 91.22% 97.29% 94.14% 9.44% 0.0127 0.0616 33.04%
the samples needed to be subjected to a more expensive
analysis using DL. Please notice that the borderline interval
is a configurable parameter of the system. Depending on the
user or organization more or less conservative intervals can be
used.
We also evaluated the performance of the HYBRID DE-
TECTOR on 7 APTs with various borderline intervals. The
HYBRID DETECTOR successfully detected all the malware
with all borderline intervals. There existed at most one false
positives (false positive rate about 10%) in all the con-
figurations. However, Random Forest detector (in isolation)
performed a much higher false positive rate (52.5%).
C. On-the-Fly Processing of Traces: HYBRID DETECTOR
with and without Delay Strategies
In this section, we show the experiments we carried out for
malware classification using the HYBRID DETECTOR on-the-
fly and with delay strategies for software subjected to DL. Our
definition of on-the-fly is an analysis that is performed while
the system is executing, contrasting with the offline analysis, in
which the system call traces are first logged and later analyzed.
We compare the performance of the HYBRID DETECTOR
with offline post-processing and on-the-fly processing, try to
explain the reasons behind the different performance results
we found in these two settings, and discuss ways our method-
ology, PROPEDEUTICA, can be applied in practice.
Table VII compares the performance of conventional ML
models and the HYBRID DETECTOR (with and without delay
strategies) when running on-the-fly experiments. Each experi-
ment ran with the same configuration, inputs, and parameters
as those shown for Table VI. Similarly to the offline results,
the HYBRID DETECTOR (for various borderline intervals)
outperforms conventional ML models, with lower false posi-
tive rate and higher F1-score. However, three aspects diverge
between online and offline results: 1) the offline results are
slightly better than on-the-fly results in terms of performance
(accuracy, precision, f1, fp rate, etc.). 2) the HYBRID DETEC-
TOR’s performance was not sensitive to the type of borderlines
intervals applied. 3) the percentage of software (malicious and
benign) that is subjected to DL analysis (i.e., move percent-
ages) increases in the on-the-fly results (e.g., move percentage
changes from 34% to 44% in the borderline interval [40%,
60%]). One reason for these differences could be the real-
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time interactions, among the ML and DL detectors, and the
system processes, such as the change of environments and the
application of the delay. We hypothesize that these interactions
in the case of on-the-fly analysis increase the overhead of the
system, in which more processes are opened and closed during
each experiment, causing a slow-down to the execution of
the offline test cases. To test this hypothesis, we measured
the total number of processes monitored for each experiment
and found that there was approximately an 50% increase in
the number of processes when the detection was performed
online. Another result that corroborates our hypothesis is that
in the on-the-fly experiments, the system call monitoring driver
collects fewer system calls than in the offline experiments.
In 5-minute experiments, many processes cannot fill up one
sliding window (the total number of collected n-gram system
calls is less than the window size). This brings incomplete data
to DEEPMALWARE—an obstacle to the classification task.
We also carried out experiments running longer time in-
tervals (10 minutes) (see Table VII). In the 10-minute exper-
iments, the processes have more time to fill up the sliding
windows, providing DEEPMALWARE with sufficient informa-
tion for classification, thus performing better than the 5-minute
experiments. Table VII shows that the overall performance
of the HYBRID DETECTOR in 10-minute runs increases com-
pared with that in 5-minute runs, and gets closer to the offline
performance. Our hypothesis is corroborated with the increase
in accuracy, precision, recall, and F1. Further, with longer
running times, broader borderlines perform better than narrow
ones.
The Effect of Delaying Strategies As described before,
in an exploratory fashion, our DEEPMALWARE prototype
adds random and probabilistic delays to selected system calls
of process subjected to DEEPMALWARE. Table VII shows
the effect of delay strategies with sleep time 50 ms and
Threshold 10%. Within each borderline interval, the results
for accuracy, precision, recall, fp rate, F1 and move percentage
are similar to those without delay strategies. Detection time,
however, decreased over 10% when we applied delay. By
analyzing our results, we discovered that benign software were
affected more by the delaying strategies than malware. An
explanation could be that the rate at which benign software
usually invoke system calls is higher than that of malware.
At the same threshold (probability of applying a strategy on
a system call), adding delay will slow down benign processes
more than malicious processes, and hence fewer system calls
are queued for DEEPMALWARE analysis. To detect the mal-
ware, DEEPMALWARE needs the same amount of traces from
malware in each experiment. Everything happens as if malware
traces are consumed faster.
D. Summary and Discussions
Real-world malware detection is challenging — on the
one hand, mission critical software should not be mistakenly
killed by a malware detector. On the other hand, the detector
should not risk allowing possible malware running in a system,
especially in the perimeter of an organization. Conventional
ML and modern DL-based malware detectors in isolation
cannot meet the needs of high accuracy, low false-positive
rate, and short detection time. Our results show that the false-
positive rate for conventional ML method can reach 20%, and
for modern DL methods is usually below 6%. However, the
computation time for DL can be 100x longer than ML on a
conventional CPU.
The HYBRID DETECTOR leverages the fast speed of con-
ventional ML and the high accuracy of modern DL. In this
work, only software receiving borderline classification from
ML detector needed further analysis by a DL detector, which
saved computational resources and shortened the detection
time without loss of accuracy. For the on-the-fly experiments,
the HYBRID DETECTOR improved the detection F1-score
from 77.54% (conventional ML method) to 90.25% (12.71%
increase), and reduced the detection time by 54.86%. Fur-
thermore, the amount of software that were subjected to DL
analysis was just a fraction (approximately 32% on average
for online detection) of the software running in the system, as
conventional ML was able to provide a high probability for
part of the clear-cut cases.
Despite the good performance of the DEEPMALWARE, there
are still challenges to be faced when applying this type of
detection model in a real system. On-the-fly analysis brings
extra workloads and more computational pressure, which is
introduced by the interactions between the HYBRID DETEC-
TOR, its supporting system, and the processes opened. Also,
traces from one process may not be able to fill up one sliding
window sometimes. One possible solution could be to apply a
smaller window size and stride in ML detector to conduct fast
detecting and to use big window size in DEEPMALWARE to
gain enough context information. We compare the accuracy
between offline and on-the-fly analysis based on Random
Forest model and HYBRID DETECTOR without delay strategies
with window size 100 and stride 50 (Figure 6). On-the-fly
analysis did much less impact on HYBRID DETECTOR than
that did on Random Forest model, specially when we use a
longer time interval in the experiments.
Delaying system calls from processes subjected to DL
analysis have the potential to gain time for DL detectors to
classify malware correctly. Since the rate at which benign
software usually invokes system calls is usually higher than
that of malware, delay strategies affected benign software more
than malware in the DL environment. As future work, we plan
to analyze the effect of different thresholds and sleeping time
for delay strategies.
The worst-case scenario for software in PROPEDEUTICA
would be looped between the ML and DEEPMALWARE. For
example, it could receive a borderline classification from the
ML detector, and then be moved to DEEPMALWARE. Then
DEEPMALWARE would classify it as benign, and the software
would continue being analyzed by the ML, which would again
provide a borderline classification, and so on.
As we discussed in Section II, a resourceful and motivated
adversary can bypass any protection mechanism. Even though
PROPEDEUTICA demonstrated itself a promising paradigm for
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TABLE VII: Comparison between conventional ML and DEEPMALWARE for on-the-fly detection. Notice that the detection time may be
longer than the experiment length, as in this case the system is still running without collecting further traces. All these experiments leveraged
a conventional non-GPU machine.
Experiment
Length Model
Upper
Bound
Lower
Bound Accuracy Precision Recall F1 FP rate Detection Time (s)
5 minutes Random Forrest N/A 78.00% 79.18% 75.79% 77.54% 20% 255.88
5 minutes HYBRID DETECTOR(no delay strategies)
20% 80% 86.13% 83.64% 80.00% 87.47% 8% 615.87
30% 70% 86.37% 84.77% 78.67% 87.88% 6% 353.26
40% 60% 87.83% 84.65% 81.85% 90.25% 6% 270.84
10 minutes HYBRID DETECTOR(no delay strategies)
20% 80% 91.96% 89.05% 95.83% 91.83% 12% 682.00
30% 70% 86.94% 84.78% 84.77% 88.10% 11% 536.56
40% 60% 88.75% 83.42% 87.98% 91.54% 10% 447.73
10 minutes
HYBRID DETECTOR
(sleep time=50 ms
threshold=10%)
20% 80% 86.61% 84.20% 83.81% 87.49% 10% 555.53
30% 70% 87.84% 82.32% 86.46% 91.22% 11% 501.02
40% 60% 88.67% 86.01% 87.30% 92.85% 10% 403.49
Fig. 6: Accuracy comparison between offline and on-the-fly analysis
based on Random Forest, HYBRID DETECTOR without delays.
on-the-fly practical malware detection, a highly sophisticated
malware could still evade detection. Further, PROPEDEUTICA
relies on the integrity of the OS for correct operation, and
attacks compromising the OS could directly compromise any
of PROPEDEUTICA’s components.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our work intersects the areas of behavior-based malware de-
tection with machine-learning and deep-learning. This section
summarizes the state-of-the-art in these areas and highlights
topics currently under-studied.
Behavior-based Malware Detection. Most of the work on
dynamic behavior-based malware detection [7], [8], [17], [65]
evolved from Forrest et al.’s seminal work [66] on detecting
attacks through system calls.
Christodorescu et al. [7], [8] extract high-level and unique
behavior from the disassembled binary to detect malware
and its variants. The detection is based on predefined tem-
plates covering potentially malicious behaviors, such as mass-
mailing and unpacking. Willems et al. proposed CWSandbox,
a dynamic analysis system that runs malware into a virtual
environment and monitor its API calls [67]. Rieck et al. [68]
processed these API calls and used them as features to
separate malware into families using Support Vector Machines
(SVM). Rieck et al. [16] uses a representation for system
calls to generate malware behavioral traces (transformed in
q-grams), which will be grouped into clusters with an al-
gorithm similar to the k-nearest neighbors (KNN). Mohaisen
et al. [69] introduce AMAL, a framework for dynamic analy-
sis and classification of malware using SVM, linear regression,
classification trees, and KNN. Kolosnjaji et al. [70] propose
the use of maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) to classify malware
samples into families through their behavioral extracted from
dynamic analysis with Cuckoo’s Sandbox [71]. Although these
techniques were successfully applied to classifying malware,
as the seminal work from Bailey et al. [72], they do not
consider benign samples. Thus, they are limited to label an
unknown malware as pertaining to one of the existing clusters.
Xiao and Stibor used system calls to distinguish among
harmless programs, network-based malware (email, IM, IRC,
net) and system-based malware (backdoors, Trojans, oth-
ers) [30]. They combined several techniques, such as 1- and
2-grams, supervised topic transition (STT), SVM and others
in a dataset of 3,048 programs, accomplishing accuracy rates
ranging from 32 to 63%. Wressnegger et al. [73] propose Gor-
don, a detection method for Flash-based malware. Gordon uses
information from static analysis and the execution behavior of
benign and malicious Flash applications to produce n-grams,
which are used as input for an SVM. Gordon was evaluated
with 26,000 samples and detected from 90 to 95% of Flash-
based malware.
Bayer et al. monitor the software behavior through API
call hooking and breakpoints using a modified version of
QEMU [12]. This approach was used to build Anubis [31],
which leverages sandboxing techniques to analyze malware
(e.g., through system calls invoked). These system calls are
then used to clusterize malware based on behavior similar-
ity [14]. Kirat et al. introduce BareBox, a dynamic anal-
ysis system based on hooking system calls directly from
SSDT [74]. Barebox is able to run in a bare metal system,
i.e., outside a virtual machine or emulator, thus potentially
obtaining behavioral traces from malware equipped with anti-
analysis techniques. PROPEDEUTICA also uses system call
hooking techniques to monitor software behavior, and has a
testbed to run malware in a large scale automatically. Anubis
works best for advanced malware analyzers who can read the
detailed execution report while PROPEDEUTICA delivers on-
thy-fly detection result to end users. PROPEDEUTICA improves
the experiment of Anubis by running longer time (10 minutes)
and using cutting-edge DL models to help on the detection.
PROPEDEUTICA is also inspired by many system-wide mon-
itoring research on malware detection, such as VMScope [75],
TTAnalyze [12], and Panorama [43]. Emulated with Qemu,
they use tainting techniques to trace the data-flow and intercept
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malicious behavior from whole-system processes. PROPE-
DEUTICA differs by monitoring software behavior through
system-wide system call hooking instead of data tainting,
and maintains the interactions among different processes in a
lightweight way. Some researchers have shown that malware
have developed strong obfuscation capabilities to evade de-
tection [76]–[78], and suggested detecting tools to avoid high
level (user level) monitoring which may inform the malware
of the existence of a tracing tool. Agreeably, the monitoring
driver and the delay mechanism in PROPEDEUTICA are both in
kernel space. Canali et al. presented the closest environment
with PROPEDEUTICA [11]. The goal of their work is to
evaluate different types of models in malware detection. Their
findings confirm that the accuracy of some widely used models
is very poor, independently of the values of their parameters,
and few, high-level atoms with arguments model is the best
one, which corroborates our assumption.
Even though a lot of work has been done on behavior-
based malware classification/detection, on-the-fly detection
still suffers from high false-positive rates due to the diver-
sity of applications and the diverse nature of system calls
invoked [17].
ML-based Malware Detection: Xie et al. proposed a one-
class SVM model with different kernel functions [79] to
classify anomalous system calls in the ADFA-LD dataset [26].
Ye et al. proposed a semi-parametric classification model
for combining file content and file relation information to
improve the performance of file sample classification [80].
Abed et al. used bag of system calls to detect malicious
applications in Linux containers [81]. Kumar et al. used K-
means clustering [82] to differentiate legitimate and malicious
behaviors based on the NSL-KDD dataset. Fan et al. utilized
an effective sequence mining algorithm to discover mali-
cious sequential patterns and trained an All-Nearest-Neighbor
(ANN) classifier based on these discovered patterns for the
malware detection [83].
The Random Forest algorithm has been applied to classifi-
cation problems as diverse as offensive tweets, malware detec-
tion, de-anonymization, suspicious Web pages, and unsolicited
email messages [84]–[90]. ML-based malware detectors suffer,
however, from high false-positive rates because of the diverse
nature of system calls invoked by applications, as well as the
diversity of applications [17].
DL-based Malware Detection: There are recent efforts to
apply deep learning for malware detection with the advances
in deep learning and big data analytics.
Pascanu et al. first applied deep neural networks (recurrent
neural networks and echo state networks) to modeling the
sequential behaviors of malware. They collected API call
sequences of the operating system and C run-time library
and detected malware as a binary classification problem [91].
David et al. [92] used deep belief network with denoising
autoencoders to automatically generate malware signature and
classified malware based these signatures. Saxe and Berlin [93]
proposed a DL-based malware detection technique with two
dimensional binary program features. They also provided a
Bayesian model to calibrate detection. Hou et al. collected the
system calls from kernel and then constructed the weighted
directed graphs and use DL framework to make dimension
reduction [94].
Recently, Kolosnjaji et al. [42] proposed a DL method
to detect and predict malware family based only on system
call sequences. The neural network architecture proposed by
them is similar to DEEPMALWARE. However, Their neural
networks do not use atrous convolutional layers, inception
design, and bidirectional recurrent neural networks, which
have been proved to increase the performance of detection
in our experiments. To deal with fast evolving of malware,
[95] recently proposed a framework called Transcend to detect
concept drift in malware. Transcend can detect the aging
machine learning models before their degradation.
Although there has been several proposals for DL-based
malware detection, most of them focus on modeling the
malicious behavior in an offline manner. Our work also pays
attention to the performance of DL-based malware detection
algorithms running in a real system.
Despite initial successes on malware classification, recent
work has demonstrated that DL is vulnerable to misclas-
sification by well-designed data samples, called adversarial
examples [96], [97]. Papernot et al. tried network distillation
to defend adversarial examples [98], but it is still vulnerable to
some strong attacks (e.g., C&W attack [96]). Wang et al. pro-
posed a robust DL technique with randomly nullifying features
for malware detection to resist adversarial examples [99]. As
future work, we plan to apply such defending method to our
DEEPMALWARE.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced PROPEDEUTICA, a novel
paradigm and proof-of-concept prototype for malware detec-
tion combines the best of conventional machine learning and
emerging deep learning techniques. Our paradigm is inspired
by the practice of propedeutics in Medicine. Propedeutics
refers to diagnose a patient condition by first performing initial
non-specialized, low-cost exams then proceeding to special-
ized, possibly expensive, diagnostic procedures if preliminary
exams are inconclusive.
The main idea proposed was that all software processes
in the system start execution subjected to a conventional ML
detector for fast classification. If a piece of software receives a
borderline classification, it is subjected to further analysis via
more performance expensive and more accurate DL methods,
via our newly proposed DL algorithm DEEPMALWARE. We
also evaluated whether adding delays to processes during
deep learning analysis would help the classification accuracy.
Further, in a exploratory fashion, we introduce delays to the
execution of software subjected to DEEPMALWARE as a way
to “buy time” for DL analysis and to rate-limit the impact of
possible malware in the system. Our results showed that such
paradigm is promising as it showed better performance (in all
standard machine learning metrics) than conventional machine
learning and deep learning in isolation. We also discussed the
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different performance results (and possible causes) for mal-
ware classification performed online (decreased performance)
and offline.
In sum, our work provided evidence that conventional
machine learning and emerging deep learning methods in iso-
lation are not enough. PROPEDEUTICA, by combining the best
capabilities of such methods intelligently has the potential to
transform the next generation of practical on-the-fly malware
detection.
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APPENDIX
A. Architecture of CNNLSTM and LSTM model
Figure 7b and Figure 7a depict the detailed architecture of
CNNLSTM and LSTM model. We compare DEEPMALWARE
with these two models to show the improvement.
(a) Illustration of CNNLSTM model
(b) Illustration of LSTM model
Fig. 7: Architecture of CNNLSTM and LSTM model
B. System Call Description
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TABLE VIII: The set contains 155 system calls, and is the largest set that have been hooked to our best knowledge.
System Call Name System Call Name System Call Name
oldNtCreateThread oldNtCreateThreadEx oldNtSetContextThread
oldNtCreateProcess oldNtCreateProcessEx oldNtCreateUserProcess
oldNtQueueApcThread oldNtSystemDebugControl oldNtMapViewOfSection
oldNtOpenProcess oldNtCreateProcess oldNtCreateProcessEx
oldNtOpenThread oldNtQuerySystemInformation oldNtSetInformationFile
oldNtQueryInformationFile oldNtCreateMutant oldNtDeviceIoControlFile
oldNtTerminateProcess oldNtDelayExecution oldNtQueryValueKey
oldNtQueryAttributesFile oldNtResumeThread oldNtCreateSection
oldNtLoadDriver oldNtClose oldNtOpenFile
oldNtNotifyChangeMultipleKeys oldNtQueryMultipleValueKey oldNtQueryObject
oldNtRenameKey oldNtSetInformationKey oldNtAllocateLocallyUniqueId
oldNtCreateDirectoryObject oldNtCreateKey oldNtCreateKeyTransacted
oldNtSetQuotaInformationFile oldNtSetSecurityObject oldNtSetValueKey
oldNtSetVolumeInformationFile oldNtUnloadDriver oldNtUnlockFile
oldNtUnmapViewOfSection oldNtWaitForSingleObject oldNtFlushInstructionCache
oldNtQueryInformationProcess oldNtSetInformationProcess oldNtAlertThread
oldNtCallbackReturn oldNtGetContextThread oldNtAlertResumeThread
oldNtContinue oldNtImpersonateThread oldNtRegisterThreadTerminatePort
oldNtSuspendThread oldNtTerminateThread oldNtOpenMutant
oldNtQueryMutant oldNtReleaseMutant oldNtSetTimerResolution
oldNtSetSystemTime oldNtQueryTimerResolution oldNtQuerySystemTime
oldNtQueryPerformanceCounter oldNtLockFile oldNtOpenEvent
oldNtQueryInformationThread oldNtQueryDirectoryFile oldNtQueryEaFile
oldNtSetInformationThread oldNtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm oldNtCreateEvent
oldNtCreateFile oldNtDeleteFile oldNtFlushVirtualMemory
oldNtFreeVirtualMemory oldNtLockVirtualMemory oldNtProtectVirtualMemory
oldNtUnlockVirtualMemory oldNtReadVirtualMemory oldNtWriteVirtualMemory
oldNtReadFile oldNtWriteFile oldNtWriteRequestData
oldNtCreatePort oldNtImpersonateClientOfPort oldNtListenPort
oldNtQueryInformationPort oldNtRequestPort oldNtAlpcAcceptConnectPort
oldNtAlpcConnectPort oldNtAlpcCreatePort oldNtAlpcCreatePortSection
oldNtAlpcDeleteResourceReserve oldNtAlpcDisconnectPort oldNtReplyWaitReceivePortEx
oldNtPrivilegeCheck oldNtAlpcOpenSenderProcess oldNtAlpcQueryInformation
oldNtAreMappedFilesTheSame oldNtAssignProcessToJobObject oldNtCancelSynchronousIoFile
oldNtCompressKey oldNtCreateEventPair oldNtCreateKeyedEvent
oldNtCreateProfile oldNtCreateSemaphore oldNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject
oldNtCreateTransactionManager oldNtDebugContinue oldNtDeletePrivateNamespace
oldNtDisableLastKnownGood oldNtDisplayString oldNtDrawText
oldNtEnumerateDriverEntries oldNtEnumerateTransactionObject oldNtGetCurrentProcessorNumber
oldNtGetNlsSectionPtr oldNtGetPlugPlayEvent oldNtGetWriteWatch
oldNtImpersonateAnonymousToken oldNtInitiatePowerAction oldNtIsProcessInJob
oldNtIsSystemResumeAutomatic oldNtLoadKey oldNtLoadKey2
oldNtMakeTemporaryObject oldNtMapUserPhysicalPagesScatter oldNtModifyBootEntry
oldNtOpenPrivateNamespace oldNtOpenResourceManager oldNtOpenSemaphore
oldNtOpenSession oldNtPrePrepareEnlistment oldNtQueryInformationEnlistment
oldNtQueryInformationResourceManager oldNtQueryInformationTransaction oldNtQueryInformationWorkerFactory
oldNtReadOnlyEnlistment oldNtRegisterProtocolAddressInformation oldNtReplacePartitionUnit
oldNtResetWriteWatch oldNtResumeProcess oldNtSaveKeyEx
oldNtSetDefaultLocale oldNtSetInformationDebugObject oldNtSetInformationJobObject
oldNtSetInformationResourceManager oldNtSetInformationTransactionManager oldNtSetIntervalProfile
oldNtSetSystemPowerState oldNtSetTimer oldNtSinglePhaseReject
oldNtVdmControl oldNtWaitLowEventPair
17
